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The Spiritual Dimension: Religion, Philosophy and Human Value, by John
Cottingham. Cambridge University Press, 2005. Pp. xii+186. $70.00 (hard
back), $24.99 (paperback).
ANDREW DOLE, Amherst College
The project of John Cottingham's The Spiritual Dimension is to advocate a
'humane turn' in discussions of religion by analytical philosophers: that
is to say, to advocate giving serious attention to "questions about human
self-understanding and self-discovery" in the philosophy of religion (p.
ix). Cottingham finds that many analytical philosophers work with an im
poverished view of religion because they fail to acknowledge the 'primacy
of praxis'- religion's connection with "ethical commitment and individual
self-awareness, with the attempt to understand the cosmos and the strug
gle to find meaning in our lives" (p. x). The Spiritual Dimension applies this
theme to a number of discussions in the philosophy of religion.
Cottingham's first chapter presents the theme of the 'primacy of praxis'
in detail. Claiming that "it is in the very nature of religious understand
ing that it characteristically stems from practical involvement rather than
intellectual analysis" (p. 6), Cottingham argues that it is crucial to under
stand religion as grounded in behavior (such as the kind of regular ritual
participation that attends long-term membership in an historical religious
tradition) and involving 'love's knowledge' (building on remarks by Pas
cal and Nussbaum, Cottingham takes religious truths to be such that "to
try to grasp them purely intellectually is to avoid them"[p. 11]). This is
not to say that religious knowledge is not susceptible to criticism and cor
rection by reason; it is to say, however, that an adequate model of religion
cannot be assembled using only the tools of rational analysis.
Chapters 2 and 3 address, respectively, theodicy and the issue of au
tonomy and heteronomy in religion. Acknowledging the primacy of prax
is generates an alternative to the view that claims of religion represent a
'best explanation' for the world we experience; rather, in order to 'rea
sonably discharge' the task of theodicy, the religious adherent needs only
a theistic account of the world which is compatible with the existence of
evil and according to which "an innocent construction can be placed on
the relevant divine acts or omissions" (p. 26). To satisfy this requirement
Cottingham sketches an account which combines elements of Leibniz's
'best of all possible worlds' strategy (if God was to create a world out
of matter, then by metaphysical necessity, that world would be subject
to entropy and corruption) with Swinburne's free will defense (suffering
presents opportunities for human self-development). In chapter 3, Cottingham considers whether it makes sense for theists to speak of God as a
source of moral value, and whether submission to the will of such a god is
compatible with human autonomy. Both questions are answered in the af
firmative: the second because Cottingham understands submission to the
will of God to involve no departure from ordinary procedures of moral
discernment, and the first because he judges attempts to provide a fully
naturalistic account of moral value unsatisfactory.
In chapter 4 Cottingham argues that philosophers should view the psy
choanalytic tradition (broadly construed) as a resource for understanding

BOOK REVIEWS

355

the workings of the human mind, rather than assuming the 'transparency
of the mental.' By way of addressing the traditional hostility between psy
choanalysis on the one hand and religion and (analytical) philosophy on
the other, Cottingham considers Freud's charge that religion is an illusion
based on a belief in the 'omnipotence of thought.' His response is two
pronged: first, much (perhaps all) of what commonly passes for religion,
inasmuch as it does assume the omnipotence of thought, is really mere su
perstition; and second, within the Jungian branch of the tradition the salu
tary effects of illusion have been noted, in that religious imagery opens
up a 'primordial psychic level' that is crucial for healthy development (p.
70). Cottingham positions psychoanalysis as a resource for 'guided self
discovery,' and ultimately for narrowing what John Hare has called the
'moral gap' (p. 74).
The poverty of the assent-to-propositions model is the focus of chap
ter 5. Acknowledging the primacy of praxis with respect to religious
language requires appreciating the role language actually plays in the
lives of religious adherents. Cottingham argues that "religious language
characteristically involves a layered structure o f mutually resonating symbols
and narratives" (p. 88). Religious adherence is akin to the adoption of an
'interpretation of reality' whose multiple layers of meaning are mutually
reinforcing; hence the question of the justification of religious adherence
cannot be profitably addressed by consideration of individual proposi
tions about transcendent realities (p. 99).
In chapter 6 Cottingham observes that religion on his construal involves
not 'grand metaphysics,' but seeing the world infused with 'value and
purpose.' Religion does, however, harbor some metaphysical ambitions,
in that the religious adherent views the world as displaying " traces of the
transcendent divine world that is its ultimate source" (p. 123). Cottingham
find this position to be compatible with contemporary methodological
naturalism (although not with ontological naturalism, which he charac
terizes as itself a 'remarkably dogmatic' piece of metaphysics of which we
have good reason to be skeptical). Seeing 'traces of the transcendent' in the
world is also compatible with Kant's philosophy of religion as presented
by recent interpretations; and because 'Enlightenment philosophy' is not
altogether hostile to religion, "the postmodernist strategy of 'dissing' the
Enlightenment" in order to defend religion (represented by John Caputo)
is as unnecessary as it is poorly informed about the content of that phi
losophy (pp. 115f.).
Chapter 7 returns to the theme of the justification of religious adherence.
The 'traces of the divine' previously describe turn out to be an experiential
justifying ground for religion (p. 136). But such 'traces' are not accessible
to all: on the contrary, it may take "a lifetime of the appropriate askesis to
acquire the capacity to appreciate them" (p. 139). In other words, religious
beliefs cannot be critically evaluated through the impartial weighing of
evidence because the relevant grounds are not publicly available. These
perceptible 'traces' save religion from being merely a 'leap in the dark,'
and so save the religious adherent from the charge of epistemic irrespon
sibility; it would seem, however, that what distinguishes religion from
mere fideism will only be evident to those who have attained a certain
level of religious development themselves. Nevertheless, appreciating
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the 'primacy of praxis' makes possible a broader approach to the justifica
tion of religion. The 'difference theistic belief makes in the actual life of
the religious adherent' turns out, according to Cottingham, to be a mat
ter of fostering development towards psychological and moral maturity,
towards the 'attainment of happiness and virtue' (p. 140). Religion is thus
fundamentally aligned with the goals of reason-guided self-development
and self-realization, and in fact may be essential for the realization of these
goals (p. 148).
In the final chapter Cottingham discusses the question of religious
pluralism. Like John Hick, he finds "a striking degree of convergence
with regard to what one might call the moral psychology of religious
practice" among the 'great religions' of the world (p. 154). Cottingham
does not embrace Hick's pluralism, however, as there are significant
incompatibilities between these religions at the level of doctrines and
specific practices. Cottingham denies the possibility of impartially eval
uating the world's religions and choosing the 'best' one, for "we can
never achieve a 'sideways on' perspective on reality" (p. 164). The proj
ect, however, of advocating one's own religion over the alternatives is
perfectly valid, for (with a nod to Neurath) "[a] sailor may offer a valid
and rational defense of the structure and design of the rudder he has
built, even though he was born on ship and recognizes that his view
of how things should be done is itself conditioned by the traditions of
life aboard this particular vessel" (p. 166). The position that Cottingham
ultimately recommends is one that is committed to a particular tradi
tion, and yet recognizes that "the imperatives of morality always take
precedence over doctrinal and metaphysical disputes" and so is tolerant
of religious diversity (p. 167).
In general, The Spiritual Dimension is a timely and well-aimed book.
Cottingham's point that important dimensions of religion have been un
der-appreciated by philosophers is certainly correct, although some of
the conclusions he draws from this point seem to point back towards
the established literature (i.e., on the problem of evil or divine command
theory) rather than towards radically new lines of inquiry. The benefits
of Cottingham's approach are most evident, it seems to me, in his rec
ommendation that philosophers explore how religious language actually
functions in the lives of adherents. As I read him Cottingham does not
argue that the propositional model is fundamentally mistaken; his work
thus articulates the possibility of deepening our understanding of reli
gious language without surrendering at the outset the idea that beliefs
about transcendent realities are a natural part of religion, which suggests
that the recovery of the field from the damage of the 'linguistic turn' is
proceeding apace.
There are, however, at least two problems with the book. First, given
that Cottingham commits himself early on to the position that the meth
ods of "careful gathering of evidence, precise mathematical modeling, and
systematic empirical testing" constitute "a paradigm of what can properly
be termed objective and reliable knowledge" (p. 19), the choice of the psy
choanalytic tradition as a resource for "systematic self-scrutiny and reflec
tive analysis" is puzzling. For the most part Freud and his school have, af
ter all, been left behind by empirical psychology as something between an
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historical prototype and an embarrassment (a fact which Cottingham does
not consider). But a more serious issue has to do with the view of 'religion'
presented here. The book assumes that 'what it is to adhere to a religion'
finds paradigmatic articulation in the 'great religious writers' of Christian
ity, supplemented by the reflections of philosophers such as Wittgenstein,
for whom the boundaries of religion could be remarkably clear. The re
ligion described therein is deeply moral, sacramentally rich, tolerant of
diversity, and characterized by 'compassion and universalism.' Such a re
ligion is certainly compatible with 'intellectual integrity and philosophical
vigor,' and so is suited to the book's apologetic aims. But not all religion,
not even all Christianity, is like this. Cottingham does not consider such
forms of Christian praxis as protesting homosexuality at military funerals,
firebombing abortion clinics, or teaching one's children in the home-school
classroom that the earth is eight thousand years old; but taking seriously
the primacy of praxis, and understanding 'how religious language actu
ally functions' in the lives of its adherents, would seem to lead naturally
to considering such cases. There is a significant tension between that ideal
of religion which Cottingham shares with his chosen sources and the goal
of understanding religion as lived, both of which he is concerned to recom
mend; and in the end, this book suggests that philosophers in search of a
deeper understanding of religion may need, in ways large and small, to
choose between these two.

Atonement, Christology and the Trinity: Making Sense o f Christian Doctrine, by
Vincent Brummer. Ashgate, 2005. viii+125 pp. $29.95 (Paper).
ANDREW S. NAM, Baylor University
Brummer's central concern is to make sense of the Christian doctrines of
atonement, Christology, and the trinity in terms of a category congenial
to our contemporary mindset: reconciliation. By doing so, he hopes to gain
a sympathetic hearing from both average Christian believers for whom a
typical abstract theological construction of those doctrines means little or
no existential applicability, and those of Jewish and Islamic traditions for
whom these doctrines constitute an enduring stumbling block.
In chapter 1, Brummer explains the limitations of metaphorical thinking,
our common, intuitive practice of seeking to understand things by com
paring them to similar objects with which we are familiar. Metaphorical
thinking regularly employed in theological abstraction (1) often fails to
recognize the relevant differences between the objects of comparison, (2)
is one-sided and selective, necessarily excluding other models due to ir
resolvable conceptual conflicts, and (3) tends to be purely theoretical and
abstract, thereby losing touch with the present cultural framework of un
derstanding and the existential nature of our relationship to God. Accord
ingly, it results in a static view of God.
Furthermore, there is 'commissive implication,' a certain set of moral,
emotional, and practical commitments, to every conceptual grammar of
the religious language game, such that we cannot understand a religious

